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NOTE
Social Networking and Freedom of Speech:
Not “Like” Old Times
Bland v. Roberts, 857 F. Supp. 2d 599 (E.D. Va. 2012)

ZACHARY SHKLAR*

I. INTRODUCTION
Facebook is a website that allows users to share photos, news, stories,
and personal anecdotes from their daily lives in an easy to follow online
community.1 The website has developed a huge following and just recently
reached the milestone of having over 1 billion users worldwide.2 Each Facebook user has a “profile” that typically shares the user’s name, a brief biographical background, pictures the user has uploaded to the site, a list of the
user’s Facebook friends, and a list of Facebook “pages” the user has “liked.”3
Unlike personal “profiles,” Facebook “pages” are set up for various groups,
such as businesses, organizations, religious groups, political groups, music
groups, sports teams, and brands in order for them to connect with users and
share that group’s messages or simply represent their respective identities.4
With such a large amount of users logged on to Facebook at any given
time, the website has become an extremely efficient way to communicate
messages, both commercially and personally. Accordingly, the website has
become one of the central means of conveying a message throughout the
world. On average, Facebook processes 2.7 billion “likes,” 300 million photo
uploads, and 2.5 billion status updates every day.5 As Facebook continues to
* J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2014; Associate
Member, Missouri Law Review, 2012-2013.
1. Brief of Facebook, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant
Daniel Ray carter, Jr. and in Support of Vacatur at 3, Bland v. Roberts, 857 F. Supp.
2d 599 (E.D. Va. 2012) (No. 12-1671) [hereinafter Facebook Amicus Brief], available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/bland_v._roberts_appeal___facebook_amicus _brief.pdf.
2. Aaron Smith, Laurie Segall & Stacy Cowley, Facebook Reaches One Billion
Users, CNN MONEY (Oct. 4, 2012), http://money.cnn.com/2012/10/04/technology
/facebook-billion-users/index.html?hpt=hp_bn5.
3. Facebook Amicus Brief, supra note 1, at 4.
4. Id.
5. Ashlee Vance, Facebook: The Making of 1 Billion Users, BUSINESSWEEK
(Oct. 4, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-10-04/facebook-themaking-of-1-billion-users#p2.
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grow and provide an effective and efficient forum to present thoughts and
ideas, it is essential that the courts protect these expressions of speech
through the First Amendment.
In Bland v. Roberts, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia was presented with the issue of whether “liking” a page on
Facebook is speech protectable by the First Amendment.6 This Note argues
that the court’s holding, that “liking” something on Facebook is not worthy of
First Amendment protection, is a disturbing result that endangers one of our
most fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. In Part II, this Note
analyzes the facts and holding of Bland v. Roberts. Next, in Part III, this
Note describes in detail how Facebook operates and explains the legal background of the first amendment and its interaction with online communication.
Part IV examines the court’s rationale in Bland v. Roberts. Lastly, Part V
explains the flaws in the court’s reasoning and provides suggestions to courts
facing similar controversies in the future.

II. FACTS & HOLDING
Plaintiff Daniel Ray Carter, Jr., worked in the Hampton sheriff’s office
in Hampton, Virginia, as a sworn, uniformed deputy sheriff.7 Defendant B.J.
Roberts was the sheriff in that office.8 In November 2009, Roberts was up
for re-election for the sheriff position.9 Jim Adams, former lieutenant colonel
in the sheriff’s department, opposed Roberts in the election.10 Roberts won
the election and subsequently decided not to reappoint Carter.11 Carter alleged that in the months leading up to the election, Roberts learned that Carter
expressed support for his opponent, Adams.12 On March 4, 2011, Carter filed
suit against Roberts “in his individual and official capacities” in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia alleging that Roberts
violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for supporting
Adams in the election.13
Specifically, Carter alleged that Roberts retaliated against him for his
expressions of support for Adams via Facebook.14 Carter argued that this
retaliation violated his right to free speech.15 Carter claimed that he sent a
message of support to Adams on his Facebook page and also “liked” Adams’
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

857 F. Supp. 2d 599.
Id. at 601.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 602.
Id. at 602-03.
Id.
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page.16 Roberts conceded that he was aware of Carter’s activity on his opponent’s Facebook page.17
Roberts claimed that his failure to reappoint Carter after his re-election
was not retaliatory in nature.18 He asserted that his decision was because of
Carter’s “unsatisfactory work performance or for [Roberts’] belief that [Carter’s] actions ‘hindered the harmony and efficiency of the [o]ffice.’”19 On
December 9, 2011, Roberts moved for summary judgment arguing that Carter
did not adequately allege a free speech violation under the Constitution, and
alternatively that even if his speech was protected under the First Amendment, Carter failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the retaliation claim.20
On April 24, 2012, the district court ruled in favor of Roberts’ motion
for summary judgment on all counts.21 The court found Carter’s evidence of
his alleged statement of support to be insufficient to support his claim.22 In
regards to Carter’s “like” of Adams’ Facebook page, the court held that
merely “liking” a Facebook page does not constitute a substantive statement
worthy of First Amendment constitutional protection.23

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for redress of grievances.”24 Rights guaranteed under the First
Amendment, and free speech specifically, have always been some of the most
cherished rights offered under the Constitution.25 However, despite the fundamental nature of the First Amendment, it is also the center of many dis-

Id. at 603.
Id.
Id. at 601-02.
Id. at 602.
Id. Furthermore, Roberts claimed he was entitled to qualified immunity in
his individual capacity on all claims and sovereign immunity in his official capacity
on all claims. Id.
21. Id. at 601.
22. Id. at 604.
23. Id. at 603.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
25. In 1920, the Supreme Court stated, “[t]hat freedom of speech and of the press
are elements of liberty all will acclaim. Indeed, they are so intimate to liberty in everyone’s convictions – we may say feelings – that there is an instinctive and instant
revolt from any limitation of them either by law or a charge under the law.” Schaefer
v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 474 (1920).
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
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putes and controversies.26 Since the passage of the First Amendment, the
Supreme Court of the United States has developed a rather complex set of
rules and doctrines that have evolved over the last century to govern different
modes of speech and expression.27
This Part will begin by describing in detail how Facebook operates. It
will also summarize important cases that demonstrate how courts have attempted to reconcile the free speech doctrine with activity online. Next, this
Part will briefly explore the difference between traditional pure speech and
symbolic expression. Finally, this Part will discuss the rights to free speech
provided to public employees.

A. Facebook
In order to have a better understanding of the legal issues at play in this
particular case, it is important to fully understand how Facebook operates.
When a user logs on to Facebook, he or she typically begins on the home
page.28 The home page is the starting point for Facebook and contains multiple links that allows users to navigate to different areas of the site.29 Additionally, the home page contains the “News Feed,” which is the primary place
a user views and interacts with shared stories and news from his or her fellow
Facebook friends or followed pages.30 The user’s News Feed is a customizable and continuously updated flow of posts made by the user’s friends and
selected pages.31 Every time a user makes a comment or shares a story, it is
placed in his or her friends’ News Feeds for their viewing pleasure.32
An additional feature of the Facebook website is the “like” button,
which is represented by a thumbs-up icon.33 The “like” button is placed underneath many types of content on Facebook, including user comments and
group pages.34 By clicking the “like” button, the user generates a “like story”
which is placed on that user’s profile page and additionally could appear in
friends’ News Feed.35 “For example, if Jane Smith [l]iked the UNICEF
Facebook page, the statement ‘Jane Smith likes UNICEF’ would appear on
her profile page along with the title of the [p]age and an icon selected by the
26. 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 1:1
(West 2012).
27. Christina E. Wells, Discussing the First Amendment, 101 MICH. L. REV.
1566, 1566 (2003) (reviewing ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN
ERA (Lee C. Bollinger & Goeffrey R. Stone eds., 2003)).
28. Facebook Amicus Brief, supra note 1, at 5.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 6.
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[p]age’s administrator.”36 If a fellow user were to click on the title of the
page or icon, it would bring him or her to that particular Facebook page just
like a hyperlink.37 When the “like [s]tory” is placed on the user’s friends’
News Feeds, it appears with that user’s name and profile picture to clearly
indicate who likes that particular page.38
With a more complete understanding of how Facebook operates, it will
be easier for courts to determine what message a user is trying to send when
he or she posts something on Facebook, including “liking” a page or story.

B. Free Speech on the Internet and Facebook
Today’s Internet era ushers in many new questions concerning free
speech. The Supreme Court of the United States must now determine what
kind of Internet activity should be protected under the First Amendment. The
Court has observed that “[r]apid changes in the dynamics of communication
and information transmission are evident not just in the technology itself but
in what society accepts as proper behavior.”39 All courts are going to be continuously challenged as the Internet era continues to change how people
communicate their ideas to the world.
In 1997, Reno v. ACLU40 answered an important inquiry – whether
speech on the Internet should be viewed just like any other speech covered
under the First Amendment. The Supreme Court of the United States ruled
that speech conducted on the Internet should be treated no differently than
any other, more traditional avenues of speech.41 Years later the Court reemphasized the importance of communications on the Internet and its subsequent protection stating, “[t]he [i]nternet . . . offer[s] a forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and
myriad avenues for intellectual activity.”42
The decision in Reno has paved the way for many activities on the Internet to be deemed worthy of First Amendment protection by lower courts.
The Second Circuit in Universal City Studios v. Corley held that posting a
hyperlink online was speech protectable under free speech principles.43 T.V.
v. Smith-Green Community School Corporation held that the posting of photos to Facebook was protected speech.44 J.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified School

Id.
Id.
Id.
City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010).
521 U.S. 844 (1997).
Id. at 870.
Ashcroft v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 566 (2002) (quoting 47
U.S.C. § 230(a)(3) (Supp. V 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
43. 273 F.3d 429, 446 (2d Cir. 2001).
44. 807 F. Supp. 2d 767, 776 (N.D. Ind. 2011).
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
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District similarly held that uploading a video to YouTube qualified as
speech.45
Facebook played a central role in two other recently decided cases regarding free speech on the Internet. In Mattingly v. Milligan,46 Mattingly
posted comments on her Facebook page referring directly to the firing of
various employees.47 The United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Arkansas ruled that Mattingly’s post was an expression of constitutionally
protected speech.48 Similarly, in Gresham v. City of Atlanta,49 the district
court ruled that a plaintiff’s post on Facebook describing the arrest of a police
officer’s son for fraud should be considered speech on a matter of public concern.50
While Mattingly and Gresham illustrate that free speech protection is
available to Facebook users for actual statements made on the site, the cases
do not address the central issue in Bland v. Roberts, which asks whether “liking” something on Facebook can be protected under the First Amendment.51

C. Pure Speech Versus Symbolic Expression
This subsection will briefly discuss the differences between the protections offered for traditional, or pure speech, and speech that falls under the
category of symbolic expression. The distinctions are important because
activity on the Internet may fall under either category of speech, each of
which has a different set of rules a court must follow.
The most basic and straightforward application of free speech occurs in
cases involving pure speech. Pure speech is entitled to “comprehensive protection.”52 This means the government cannot regulate pure speech based on
the speech’s content.53 For example, the government could not make a law
outlawing books on how to legally avoid paying taxes.54 Pure speech generally encompasses words that are spoken or written, including “books, magazines, newspapers, radio, television, [and] public speeches.”55

45. 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1122 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
46. Mattingly v. Milligan, No. 4:11 CV00215 JLH, 2011 WL 5184283 (E.D.

Ark. Nov. 1, 2011).
47. Id. at *2-3.
48. Id. at *3-4.
49. Gresham v. City of Atlanta, No. 1:10-CV-1301-RWS, 2011 WL 4601020
(N.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 2011).
50. Id. at *2.
51. Bland v. Roberts, 857 F. Supp. 2d 599, 603-04 (E.D. Va. 2012).
52. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
53. Free Speech (Supreme Court Drama), ENOTES, http://www.enotes.com/freespeech-reference/freedom-speech-299523 (last visited Feb. 1, 2013).
54. Id.
55. Id.
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One area of pure speech that has been particularly well protected is politically oriented speech. In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,56 the
Supreme Court of the United States reversed a fine imposed on a pamphleteer
who distributed an anonymous pamphlet opposing a proposed school tax
levy.57 The Court reasoned:
Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of
candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution. The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political expression in order
to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social changes desired by the people.58
The Court recently reiterated this view in the landmark case Citizens United
v. Federal Elections Commission,59 by stating political speech “is central to
the meaning and purpose of the First Amendment.”60
The Supreme Court of the United States has also long held that putting
up a political sign on a private residence warrants protection under the free
speech doctrine as pure speech.61 In City of Ladue v. Gilleo, the Court stated
that when a citizen places a sign at a residence, it creates “a message quite
distinct from placing the same sign someplace else . . . [S]uch signs provide
information about the identity of the ‘speaker.’”62 In addition, “[r]esidential
signs are an unusually cheap and convenient form of communication. Especially for persons of modest means or limited mobility, a yard or window sign
may have no practical substitute.”63
Beyond pure speech, the First Amendment free speech doctrine also
protects symbolic expression.64 The Supreme Court of the United States in
Texas v. Johnson stated, “[t]he First Amendment literally forbids the abridgment only of ‘speech,’ but we have long recognized that its protection does
not end at the spoken or written word.”65 Symbolic expression encompasses
activities such as gestures and conduct.66 For instance, the Supreme Court in

56. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
57. Id. at 357.
58. Id. at 346 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976)) (internal

quotation marks omitted).
59. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
60. Id. at 892.
61. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 54-55 (1994).
62. Id. at 56.
63. Id. at 57.
64. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 400 (1989).
65. Id. at 404.
66. James M. McGoldrick, Jr., Symbolic Speech: A Message from Mind to Mind,
61 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2008).
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West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette67 held that refusing to
recite the pledge of allegiance was protected by free speech.68 The Court
went on to say, “[s]ymbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas. The use of an emblem or flag to symbolize some system, idea,
institution, or personality, is a short cut from mind to mind.”69
Over the years, the Supreme Court of the United States has demonstrated the breadth of activities that may constitute protected symbolic expression. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,70
the Court held that wearing black armbands was symbolic speech “closely
akin to ‘pure speech.’”71 In Schacht v. United States,72 the wearing of a military uniform in an attempt to criticize American involvement in Vietnam was
held as protected speech.73 A sit-in by African Americans in a whites-only
area to protest segregation was held to be symbolic speech in Brown v. Louisiana.74 Texas v. Johnson held that the burning of the American flag was
protected as symbolic free speech as well.75
The problem that arises for courts is deciding what type of behavior and
activity is truly worthy of being protected as symbolic expression. As the
Supreme Court of the United States has pointed out, “[i]t is possible to find
some kernel of expression in almost every activity a person undertakes – for
example, walking down the street or meeting one’s friends at a shopping mall
– but such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity within the protection
of the First Amendment.”76 The modern test for what constitutes symbolic
expression is derived from Spence v. Washington.77 In protest of the United
States’ invasion of Cambodia and the killings at Kent State University,
Spence hung an American flag upside-down from his residence with a peace
sign affixed to the flag.78 Spence’s stated purpose was to show that America
stood for peace instead of war and violence.79 He was convicted under a
Washington state statute that penalized the improper display of an American
flag.80 The Supreme Court overturned the conviction and found that Spence
had engaged in symbolic expression worthy of First Amendment protection.81
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

319 U.S. 624 (1943).
Id. at 642.
Id. at 632.
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
Id. at 505-06.
398 U.S. 58 (1970).
See generally id.
383 U.S. 131, 141-42 (1966).
491 U.S. 397, 405-06 (1989).
City of Dall. v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989).
418 U.S. 405 (1974).
Id. at 405, 407-08.
Id. at 408.
Id. at 406-07.
Id. at 415.
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The Court defined symbolic speech as being “imbued with elements of communication” with “a particularized message” as to which “the likelihood was
great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.”82

D. Speech by Public Employees
Regardless of whether the speech being analyzed is pure speech or symbolic expression, the context of where the speech is delivered is also of great
importance.83 Otherwise protectable speech may not receive protection if the
speech occurs in a place where the government has a sufficient interest in
regulating that speech, such as a public school or public place of employment.
Pickering v. Board of Education84 developed special rules about what
speech can be protected in the case of public employees.85 In Pickering, a
teacher made comments to a newspaper criticizing the school administration’s proposals to raise new revenues for the school.86 As a result, she was
fired.87 The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the teacher’s termination, stating
that the comments were detrimental to the best interests of the school.88 The
Supreme Court of the United States disagreed, concluding that public employees do not “relinquish the First Amendment rights they would otherwise
enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public interest.”89 The Court
stated that these First Amendment rights can be defeated if they are outweighed by the government’s interests, as an employer, in the operation of
the public workplace and the efficient delivery of public services by public
employees.90 However, the public interest in “having free and unhindered
debate on matters of public importance – the core value of the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment – is . . . great . . . .”91
The Supreme Court has defined public concern as speech that is the
“subject of legitimate news interest” and speech that is the “subject of general
interest and of value and concern to the public . . . .”92 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals has added, “[t]o deserve First Amendment protection, it is
sufficient that the speech concern matters in which even a relatively small
segment of the general public might be interested.”93 One such topic that has
Id. at 409-11.
Id. at 410.
391 U.S. 563 (1995).
See generally id.
Id. at 564.
Id.
Id. at 565.
Id. at 568.
Id.
Id. at 573.
City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83-84 (2004).
Roe v. City of S.F., 109 F.3d 578, 585 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Dishnow v.
Sch. Dist., 77 F.3d 194, 197 (7th Cir. 1996).
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
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consistently been held to be a matter of public concern is a public employee’s
speech on the merits of a candidate for public office.94 Courts have even
gone so far as to recognize that public employees are often in the best position to make comments on political candidates.95
The Fourth Circuit uses the test developed in McVey v. Stacey, its version of the Pickering test, to determine if speech regards a matter of public
concern.96 McVey established that a public employee must show:
(1) whether the public employee was speaking as a citizen upon a
matter of public concern or as an employee about a matter of personal interest; (2) whether the employee’s interest in speaking . . .
outweighed the government’s interest in providing effective and
efficient services to the public; and (3) whether the employee’s
speech was a substantial factor in the employee’s termination decision.97
Public employee speech on matters of public concern is subject to exception.98 In Garcetti v. Ceballos, a deputy district attorney claimed he was
retaliated against for writing his opinions to his superiors on what he perceived to be an inaccurate warrant being used in a prosecution by his office.99
The appellate court held that governmental misconduct, such as Ceballos
alleged, was “inherently a matter of public concern” and protected free
speech.100 The Supreme Court of the United States disagreed, noting that the
appellate court did not consider whether Ceballos’ speech was made in his
capacity as a private citizen or in his role as an employee.101 The Court stated
that “a public employee’s speech is deprived of First Amendment protection
whenever those views are expressed, to government workers or others, pursu94. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983) (characterizing issues
of public concern as subjects “relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community”); Conley v. Elkton, 190 Fed. App’x 246, 252 (4th Cir. 2006)
(unpublished) (discussing comment by deputy to bystander concerning whom he
should vote for Sheriff was a matter of public concern); Orga v. Williams, 996 F.2d
1211 (4th Cir. 1993) (unpublished) (stating speech regarding who was most qualified
to be Sheriff is undoubtedly protected).
95. See, e.g., Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994) (“Government employees are often in the best position to know what ails the agencies for which they
work; public debate may gain much from their informed opinions”); Sanjour v. EPA,
56 F.3d 85, 94 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“[G]overnment employees are in a position to offer
the public unique insights into the workings of government generally and their areas
of specialization in particular.”).
96. McVey v. Stacy, 157 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 1998).
97. Id. at 277-78.
98. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
99. Id. at 414-15.
100. Id. at 416.
101. Id.
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ant to an employment responsibility.”102 The Court found that a part of Ceballos’ duties as a calendar deputy was to exercise “supervisory responsibilities over other lawyers.”103 Accordingly, his memo alleging misconduct was
made under his role as an employee and not as a private citizen and thus not
worthy of First Amendment protection.104

IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Bland v. Roberts, the court began its analysis by determining the
standard Carter needed to prove in order to recover for his freedom of speech
retaliation claim.105 In order to obtain relief, Carter had to satisfy the test
developed in McVey v. Stacey.106 The court stated that if the first prong of the
McVey test was not satisfied,107 the remaining prongs did not need to be analyzed, as there would be no speech worthy of protection.108
The court ruled that Carter failed to satisfy the first prong of the McVey
test, meaning the court did not believe that Carter had engaged in speech as a
citizen on a matter of public concern.109 While the court acknowledged that
Roberts was aware of Carter’s “like” of his opponents Facebook page, the
court found it to be irrelevant.110 Since the court did not consider Carter’s
“like” to be speech, Roberts’ admission of his awareness of the “like” had no
bearing on the analysis.111 The court concluded “that merely ‘liking’ a Facebook page is insufficient speech to merit constitutional protection.”112
Citing Mattingly v. Milligan and Gresham v. City of Atlanta, the court
acknowledged that other courts have found certain activity on Facebook to be
constitutionally protected speech.113 The court distinguished the current fact
pattern because “[b]oth Gresham and Mattingly involved actual statements.”114 The court claimed that “liking” a Facebook page does not amount

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 413.
Id. at 421.
857 F. Supp. 2d 599, 602-03 (E.D. Va. 2012).
Id.
The first prong is “whether the public employee was speaking as a citizen
upon a matter of public concern or as an employee about a matter of personal interest.” McVey v. Stacy, 157 F.3d 271, 277-78 (4th Cir. 1998); see also supra Part
III.C.
108. Bland, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 603.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 603-04. For more detail on these cases, see supra Part III.A.
114. Bland, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 604.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
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to an actual statement such as those protected in Mattingly and Gresham.115
The court stated:
Simply liking a Facebook page is insufficient. It is not the kind of
substantive statement that has previously warranted constitutional
protection. The [c]ourt will not attempt to infer the actual content
of Carter’s posts from one click of a button on Adams’ Facebook
page. For the [c]ourt to assume that the [p]laintiff[] made some
specific statement without evidence of such statements is improper.116
Because the court ruled that Carter’s “like” was not sufficient speech to
warrant protection under the First Amendment, the court granted Roberts’
motion for summary judgment.117

V. COMMENT
The district court’s curtailed and conclusory analysis of the First
Amendment issue in Bland v. Roberts did not adequately represent the decades of free speech precedent set by the Supreme Court of the United States.
Carter’s Internet activity should have been protected under the free speech
doctrine just like other forms of pure speech.118 Even if the court were unwilling to classify “liking” something on Facebook as pure speech, Carter’s
activity surely then should have fallen under the category of symbolic expression.119 In today’s society, as the Internet continues to expand into almost
every facet of our daily lives, judicial decisions that fail to comprehend the
true nature of Internet activity pose a serious threat to the liberties guaranteed
by the First Amendment.
This Part will begin by pointing out the flawed reasoning of the court,
which led it to a holding that cannot be sustained under the current interpretation of the free speech doctrine. This Part will conclude with what conflicts
courts should expect going forward in the ever growing Internet era as well as
a guide of how to best handle these conflicts.

115. See id. Interestingly, the court did not engage in any discussion of whether
the “like” could qualify as an act of symbolic expression because the plaintiffs did not
“sufficiently allege[] that they engaged in expressive speech.” Id. at 602.
116. Id. at 604.
117. Id. at 610.
118. See supra Part III.C.
119. See supra Part III.C.
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A. The Court’s Misguided Opinion
The court made two mistakes in analyzing whether a “like” should be
protected under the free speech doctrine. First, the court mistakenly concluded that “liking” a page on Facebook does not amount to an actual statement. Second, the court failed to consider if Carter’s Facebook activity constituted symbolic expression.

1. Failing to Recognize a “Like” as a Statement
With the basic understanding of how Facebook operates, it is easy to see
the flaws in the court’s opinion. The court claimed that “merely ‘liking’ a
Facebook page is insufficient speech to merit constitutional protection.”120
Furthermore, the court distinguished this case from other Facebook cases
where free speech protection was granted because those cases “involved actual statements.”121 The court was simply wrong to view “liking” a political
candidate’s Facebook page as not engaging in an actual statement. When
Carter “liked” Jim Adams’ Facebook page, the “like [s]tory” was published
on Carter’s Facebook profile page.122 This ensured that any Facebook user
who visited Carter’s profile page would see the words “Daniel Carter likes
Jim Adams for Hampton Sheriff.”123 Furthermore, by “liking” Adams’ page,
Carter also ensured that an announcement would appear on his friends’ News
Feeds comprised of the same words that appeared on his profile page, and
would even be accompanied by Carter’s picture to clearly identify the source
of the words.124
The court further justified its view that Carter’s activity was not an actual statement by stating, “[t]he [c]ourt will not attempt to infer the actual
content of Carter’s posts from one click of a button on Adams’ Facebook
page. For the [c]ourt to assume that the [p]laintiff[] made some specific
statement without evidence of such statements is improper.”125 The problem
with this reasoning, however, is that the court simply did not have to make
any inferences nor did it lack evidence of the content of Carter’s statement.
As explained above, the actual content of Carter’s “like” was the statement
“Daniel Carter likes Jim Adams for Hampton Sheriff.” The court did not
need to make any further inferences to decipher Carter’s speech. It should
Bland, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 603.
Id. at 604.
See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text. “Jim Adams for Hampton
Sheriff” was the title of the Jim Adams’ Facebook Page. Jim Adams for Hampton
Sheriff,
FACEBOOK,
http://www.facebook.com/pages/Jim-Adams-for-HamptonSheriff/101482822031 (last visited Feb. 8, 2013).
124. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
120.
121.
122.
123.

125. Bland, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 604.
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not matter that Carter accomplished making an actual statement through one
click of the button rather than through multiple keystrokes; the message was
the same. Just because Carter accomplished his message in a more efficient
manner does not mean that he did not engage in speech worthy of protection.
If the court had recognized the fact that Carter generated an actual
statement by clicking the “like” button, then the only rational holding would
have been to grant free speech protection to the “like” as a statement of pure
speech. Carter’s endorsement of a political candidate on Facebook through
“liking” the candidate’s page should be treated no differently than if he had
put up a sign on his front yard stating, “I like Jim Adams for Hampton Sheriff.”
As previously above, the Supreme Court of the United States has held
that putting a political sign at a private residence warrants protection.126 The
Court’s rationale for recognizing free speech for political residential signs
should apply with equal strength to “liking” a political candidate’s Facebook
page. “Liking” a Facebook page provides information about the identity of
the speaker since the content of the speech is located on that user’s own profile and is even accompanied by a picture of the speaker.127 Additionally,
there is absolutely no cost associated with “liking” a page on Facebook and is
ultimately even more convenient than putting up a sign in the front yard or
window. “Liking” a page on Facebook should therefore be treated just as
favorably by the courts as putting up a sign on residential property.
In its analysis, the court also proclaimed “[s]imply liking a Facebook
page . . . is not the kind of substantive statement that has previously warranted constitutional protection.”128 The court here was again mistaken as the
Supreme Court of the United States has found that the First Amendment is
not limited to “substantive statements.”129 In fact, the Court has expressly
stated that a “succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitutional protection.”130 Additionally, political endorsements need not be elabo-

See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
Bland, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 604.
See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2545-47 (2012) (rejecting
argument that the limited value of false statements exempts them from First Amendment protection); United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1591 (2010) (“Most of
what we say to one another lacks religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value (let alone serious value), but it is still sheltered from
government regulation.” (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); IMS
Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 271-72 (2d Cir. 2010) (“The First Amendment
protects ‘[e]ven dry information, devoid of advocacy, political relevance, or artistic
expression.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley,
273 F.3d 429, 446 (2d Cir. 2001))), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
130. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bi-Sexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557,
569 (1995).
126.
127.
128.
129.
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rate or detailed in order to constitute speech.131 As City of Ladue demonstrates, a simple sign endorsing a preferred candidate is enough.132 Carter’s
“like” of Adams’ Facebook page therefore is indeed the kind of “substantive
statement” that has previously been granted protection.

2. Failing to Consider Symbolic Expression
Even if the court refuses to acknowledge that “liking” a Facebook page
comprises pure speech, the activity should fall under the umbrella of symbolic expression. Surprisingly, nowhere in the opinion did the court even
consider Carter’s actions as symbolic expression. As previously noted, the
free speech doctrine goes beyond the written and spoken word and encompasses many other human actions.133 Undoubtedly, Carter’s “like” of Adams’
Facebook page should constitute symbolic expression. Clearly, the intent of
Carter’s activity was to convey the particularized message that he supported
Adams for Hampton sheriff.
Furthermore, Facebook users clearly understand the meaning of clicking
the “like” button.134 Even non-Facebook users would have an easy time understanding the message conveyed by “liking” a political candidate’s Facebook page. The word “like” is used proficiently in the English language and
conveys the exact same meaning in this context as its common everyday usage. Finally, “liking” something on Facebook is also accompanied with the
universal sign of approval – the thumbs-up symbol. Thus, even if the court
was unwilling to say Carter engaged in actual pure speech, his activity still
conveyed an actual message that was understandable to the public and should
therefore have been covered by the free speech doctrine as symbolic expression.

B. Going Forward
Currently, three out of every four Americans use some sort of social
media.135 This percentage should continue to rise as the Internet continues to
evolve. As mentioned above, this court’s interpretation of the First Amendment and how the doctrine relates to the online community presents great
concerns. It is essential that courts in the future spend greater effort in fully
understanding how United States citizens use the Internet in communicating
See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 54-55 (1994).
See supra Part III.C.
Every minute there are over 300,000 “likes” on Facebook. One Minute on
Facebook, TIME, http://www.time.com/time/video/player/0,32068,711054024001_
2037229,00.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2013).
135. Ethan Zelizer, Embracing and Controlling Social Media in the Workplace,
CBA REC., Nov. 2010, at 52, 53.
131.
132.
133.
134.
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ideas instead of reaching conclusory decisions such as in the instant decision.
The judicial system should have ample opportunities to explore this topic in
future decisions as free speech issues relating to Internet activity will doubtlessly continue to fill up dockets.
Incidents involving political campaigns on social media websites and
free speech, such as the conflict between Carter and Roberts, are bound to
arise. In 2006, Facebook for the first time allowed candidates to create campaign pages dedicated to rally support for his or her election.136 Those pages
ended up playing a significant role in congressional elections and in the
presidential election in 2008.137 During the 2012 presidential campaign,
candidates Barack Obama and Mitt Romney both used Facebook applications
and pages to gather support.138 Social media websites give political candidates the ability to reach millions of voters they never had access to in the
past.139 With the increased amount of campaigning on sites such as Facebook, speech commenting on these campaigns will continue to rise online as
well. This online political commentary deserves the same protection as has
been given traditional political speech.140
The problem will lie in how Internet users effectuate their political message on the Internet. Simple typed messages on social media websites should
not present courts many challenges in applying the doctrine of free speech.141
But more nuanced mechanisms, such as “liking” something on Facebook, to
convey a political message may present more of a problem for the courts. To
make matters even more complicated, technology is rapidly changing and
new methods for conveying a message will continually be developed. For
instance, along with the “like” button, Facebook also has the option to
“share” a story.142 For example, if Carter saw an article online entitled “Why
You Should Oppose Sherriff Roberts for Re-election”, he could share it with
his Facebook friends by clicking the “share” button. When this happens,
Facebook would post on Carter’s profile page and in his friends’ News Feeds
the words “Carter shared the article ‘[W]hy You Should Oppose Sheriff Roberts for Re-election.” While “sharing” a story on Facebook seems similar to
“liking” a story on Facebook, the latter seems to be speech comprised of part

136. Facebook Amicus Brief, supra note 1, at 12.
137. Id.; see Jane S. Schacter, Digitally Democratizing Congress? Technology

and Political Accountability, 89 B.U. L. REV. 641, 659, 659 n.79 (2009).
138. Sara Burnett, GOP, Democrats Take Political Scrap Online, THE DENVER
POST, May 28, 2012, http://www.denverpost.com/politics/ci_20724874/gop-.
139. See id.
140. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
141. See Mattingly v. Milligan, No. 4:11CV00215 JLH, 2011 WL 5184283 (E.D.
Ark. Nov. 1, 2011); Gresham v. City of Atlanta, No. 1:10-CV-1301-RWS, 2011 WL
4601020 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 2011).
142. See How Sharing Works, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/
sharing (last visited Feb. 15, 2013).
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advocacy and part information sharing, while the former is simply information sharing. Should the two activities receive the same treatment?143
Even more mind boggling, Facebook recently developed technology that
automatically posts in a user’s friends’ News Feeds whenever the user read an
article or watched a video online without ever having to click a “like” or
“share” button.144 For example, if Carter read a New York Times article online entitled “Why Sheriff Roberts is Evil,” Facebook would post on Carter’s
profile page and in his friends’ News Feeds, “Carter read ‘Why Sheriff Roberts is Evil.’” Should this sort of activity be given free speech protection?
The message delivered by this activity may be less clear to the public as the
previous example. Should a court assume that Carter was making some sort
of conveyable message just because he read an article online?
In the imminent future, many challenging Internet free speech issues
will be presented to courts. The proper first step for any court presented with
such a challenge should be to fully comprehend the Internet activity being
scrutinized before trying to apply the appropriate free speech principles.
Without fully understanding what the citizen actually did on the Internet, and
the motivation and intent behind that particular activity, it is almost impossible for a court to correctly conduct the proper First Amendment analysis.145
This type of misunderstanding is what led an erroneous holding in the instant
decision.

VI. CONCLUSION
The First Amendment doctrine of free speech is a bedrock principle in
the United States. Free speech is one of the core liberties that underlies our
democracy and protects against the tyranny of an overreaching government,
and as such, deserves the utmost protection. If followed, the court’s holding
in Bland v. Roberts endangers the decades of precedent established by the
Supreme Court of the United States and clouds the future of free speech in
this country.
The court failed to comprehend that activity on the Internet, such as
“liking” a page on Facebook, is simply a new means for people to communicate ideas in an efficient and effective manner. Internet expression and
speech deserve the same treatment by the courts as more traditional avenues
of speech. It should not matter how a person accomplishes the communication of a message; be it through oral speech on a street corner, a book printed
143. Sharing a story on Facebook appears strikingly similar to posting a hyperlink
online which the court has deemed constitutional in Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 449, 457-58 (2d Cir. 2001).
144. Burnett, supra note 138.
145. This responsibility should be even more vital for an attorney representing a
client claiming free speech as a defense. A zealous advocate should not leave the
Court in a position to misunderstand the online expressions of his or her client.
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on Gutenberg’s printing press, a set of moving images shot through a film
recorder, a symbol flown from a window, or a message sent through the click
of a mouse. If a person is communicating an idea that others will comprehend, it deserves First Amendment protection. It is impossible to predict
what new technologies the future will bring, but we know for certain that
methods we use to communicate will continually evolve just as they have for
thousands of years. If courts are unwilling to adapt to these changes, then we
risk losing one of our most cherished freedoms.
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